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Abstract Finding and fixing software vulnerabilities have
become a major struggle for most software development
companies. While generally without alternative, such fixing
efforts are a major cost factor, which is why companies have
a vital interest in focusing their secure software development
activities such that they obtain an optimal return on this
investment. We investigate, in this paper, quantitatively the
major factors that impact the time it takes to fix a given
security issue based on data collected automatically within
SAP’s secure development process, and we show how the
issue fix time could be used tomonitor the fixing process.We
use three machine learning methods and evaluate their pre-
dictive power in predicting the time to fix issues. Interest-
ingly, the models indicate that vulnerability type has less
dominant impact on issue fix time than previously believed.
The time it takes to fix an issue instead seems much more
related to the component in which the potential vulnerability
resides, the project related to the issue, the development
groups that address the issue, and the closeness of the soft-
ware release date. This indicates that the software structure,
the fixing processes, and the development groups are the
dominant factors that impact the time spent to address
security issues. SAP can use the models to implement a
continuous improvement of its secure software development
process and to measure the impact of individual improve-
ments. The development teams at SAP develop different
types of software, adopt different internal development
processes, use different programming languages and
platforms, and are located in different cities and countries.
Other organizations, may use the results—with precaution—
and be learning organizations.
Keywords Human factors  Secure software  Issue fix
time
1 Introduction
Fixing vulnerabilities, before and after a release, is one of
the most costly and unproductive software engineering
activities. Yet, it comes with few alternatives, as code-level
vulnerabilities in the application code are the basis of
increasingly many exploits [1]. Large software develop-
ment enterprises, such as SAP, embed in their development
process activities for identifying vulnerabilities early, such
as dynamic and static security testing [2]. Next to that,
SAP’s security development lifecycle (see, e.g., [3] for
Microsoft’s security development lifecycle) includes a
process for fixing vulnerabilities after a software release.
Analyzing and fixing security issues is a costly under-
taking that impacts a software’s time to market and
increases its overall development and maintenance cost. In
result, software development companies have an interest to
determine the factors that impact the effort, and thus, the
time it takes to fix security issues, in particular to:
• identify time-consuming factors in the secure develop-
ment process,
• better understand affecting factors,
• focus on important factors to enhance software’s
security level,
• accelerate secure software development processes, and
• enhance security cost planning for software develop-
ment projects.
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In a previous study, Othmane et al. [4] conducted expert
interviews at SAP to identify factors that impact the effort
of fixing vulnerabilities. SAP collects data about fixing
security issues (potential vulnerabilities that need to be
analyzed further manually to ensure whether they are
vulnerabilities or false positive issues) both during a soft-
ware’s development and after its release. With this study
we supplement the previous qualitative, interview-based
results with objectively gathered system data. In this study,
we used these data to identify and quantify, using machine
learning, to what extent automatically measured factors
impact a given issue’s fix time. By issue fix time, we mean
the duration between the time at which a security issue is
reported to SAP and the time at which the issue is marked
as closed in number of days. For simplicity, we use the
term issue to refer to a security issue in the remaining of
the paper.
Vulnerabilities are subset of software defects; they allow
violation of constraints that can lead to malicious use of the
software. The information, tools, and expertise that help to
analyze faults (functionalities errors) apply with limited
efficacy to analyze vulnerabilities. Zimmermann et al. [5]
reported, for example, that the number of vulnerabilities is
highly correlated with code dependencies, while the met-
rics that are correlated with faults such as size of changed
code have only small effect. In addition, detecting faults
requires exercising the specified functionalities of the
software, while vulnerabilities analysis requires the soft-
ware developers to have the knowledge and expertise to
think like attackers [6]. Moreover, vulnerabilities detection
tools do not provide often sufficient information to locate
the issue easily, besides that they report high number of
false positive. Thus, it is believed that ‘‘finding vulnera-
bilities is akin to finding a needle in a haystack’’ [6]. Also
vulnerabilities issues occur much less frequently then
faults. Thus, models derived from data related to faults and
vulnerabilities issues have to deal with unbalanced data-
sets, c.f., [7]. Therefore, better prediction models of issue
fix time should use only security issues data and consider
the characteristics of issues.
For the analysis, we use five data sources based on
distinct system tools available at SAP. The first three main
data sources relate to security issues; issues found by code
scanners for the programming language ABAP [8] (Data
source 1) and for Java, JavaScript, and C (Data source 2),
as well as issues found in already released code, which are
communicated through so-called security messages, for
instance reported by customers, security experts or SAP’s
own security team (Data source 3). The other two data
sources comprise support data. They describe the compo-
nents, i.e., a group of applications that performs a common
business goal such as sales order or payroll (Support data
1), and the projects (Support data 2).
After cleaning the data, we used three methods to
develop prediction models, based on (1) linear regression,
(2) Recursive PARTitioning (RPART), and (3) Neural
Network Regression (NNR). Next, we measured the mod-
els’ accuracy using three different metrics. Interestingly,
the models indicate that the impact of a vulnerability’s type
(buffer overflow, cross-site-scripting, etc.) is less dominant
than previously believed. Instead, the time it takes to fix an
issue is more related to the component in which the vul-
nerability resides, the project related to the issue, to the
development groups that address the issue, and to the
closeness of the software release date.
SAP can use the results of this study to identify costly
pain points and important areas in the secure development
process and to prioritize improvements to this process.
Such models can be used to establish a learning organi-
zation, which learns and improves its processes based on
the company-specific actual facts reflected in the collected
data [9]. Since SAP collects the models’ input data con-
tinuously, the models can be used to analyze the com-
pany’s processes and measure the impact of enhancements
over time.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we give an
overview of related work (Sect. 2), discuss SAP’s approach
to secure software development (Sect. 3), and provide an
overview of the regression methods and model accuracy
metrics that we use in the study (Sect. 4). Next, we
describe the research methodology that we applied
(Sect. 5), report about our findings (Sect. 6), and analyze
the factors that impact the issue fix time (Sect. 7). Subse-
quently, we discuss the impacts and the limitations of the
study (Sect. 8) and the main lessons (and surprises) that we
learned (Sect. 9), and conclude the paper.
2 Related Work
There is related work on prediction models for develop-
ment efforts and time to fix bugs but work in the area of
effort estimation for fixing security issues is scarce. Thus,
we discuss in this section related work that investigates
influencing factors on issue fix time or vulnerability fix
time and also the development of prediction models for
effort estimations, and differentiates them from our work.
Cornell measured the time that the developers spent
fixing vulnerabilities in 14 applications [10]. Table 1
shows the average time the developers in the study take to
fix vulnerabilities for several vulnerability types. Cornell
found that there are vulnerability types that are easy to fix,
such as dead code, vulnerability types that require applying
prepared solutions, such as a lack of authorization, and
vulnerability types that, although simple conceptually, may
require a long time to fix for complex cases, such as SQL
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injection. The vulnerability type is thus one of the factors
that indicate the vulnerability fix time but is certainly not
the only one [4].
In previous work, Othmane et al. [4] reported on a
qualitative study conducted at SAP to identify the factors
that impact the effort of fixing vulnerabilities and thus the
vulnerability fix time. The study involved interviews with
12 security experts. Through these interviews, the authors
identified 65 factors that include, beside the vulnerabilities
characteristics, the structure of the software involved, the
diversity of the used technologies, the smoothness of the
communication and collaboration, the availability and
quality of information and documentation, the expertise
and knowledge of developers and security coordinators,
and the quality of the code analysis tools.
Several studies aim at predicting the time to fix
bugs [11–17]. Zhang et al. [18] conducted an empirical
study on three open-source software to examine what
factors affect the time between bug assignment to a
developer and the time bug fixing starts, that is the
developer’s delay (when fixing bugs), along three dimen-
sions: bug reports, source code, and code changes. The
most influencing factor found was the issue’s level of
severity. Other factors are of technical nature, such as sum
of code churn, code complexity or number of methods in
changed files as well as the maximum length of all com-
ments in a bug report. Similar to our study, Zhang et al.
were interested in revealing the factors that impact time,
but as opposed to them we focus on security issues, not on
bugs, and include in our analysis not only automatically
collected information about security issues before and after
release, but additionally component- and project-related
factors from which human-based and organizational factors
can be derived. In contrast to Zhang et al., we consider the
overall fix time that starts at the time when a security issue
is reported and ends when the issue is marked as closed.
Menzies et al. [19] estimated projects development
effort, using project-related data, such as the type of teams
involved, the development time of the projects, and the
number of high-level operations within the software. They
found that it is better to use local data based on related
projects instead of global data, which allows to account for
project-related particularities that impact the development
effort. Their data sample is a ‘‘global dataset’’ that includes
data from several research software projects conducted by
different entities. We believe that the issue is related to
contextual information that are not captured by the data
and are related to the entities. Instead, our data are related
to thousands of projects developed by quasi-independent
development teams that use, for example, different pro-
gramming languages and platforms (e.g., mobile, cloud,
Web), adopt different internal processes, and are located in
several countries and cities.
In another study, Menzies et al. [20] reassured the use-
fulness of static code attributes to learn defect predictors.
They showed that naive Bayes machine learning methods
outperform rule-based or decision tree learning methods
and they showed, on the other hand, that the choice of
learning methods used for defect predictions can be much
more important than used attributes. Unlike this previous
work, we use static code attributes to predict issue fix time
and we use neural networks as additional method for
prediction.
Following the objective to reduce effort for security
inspection and testing, Shin et al. [21] used in their
empirical study code complexity, code churn, and devel-
oper activity metrics obtained to predict vulnerable code
locations with logistic regressions. They also used J48
decision trees, random forest, and Bayesian network clas-
sification techniques based on data obtained from two
large-scale open-source projects using code characteristics
and version control data. They found out that the combi-
nation of these metrics is effective in predicting vulnerable
files. Nevertheless, they state that further effort is necessary
to characterize differences between faults and vulnerabili-
ties and to enhance prediction models. Unlike Shin et al.,
our empirical research focuses on predictions using system-
based data to predict vulnerability fix time.
Hewett and Kijsanayothin [17] developed models for
defect repair time prediction using seven different machine
learning algorithms, e.g., decision trees and support vector
machines. Their predictive models are based on a case
study with data from a large medical software system.
Similar to our approach they consider the whole repair time
including all phases of a defect lifecycle. They use twelve
defect attributes selected by domain experts for their esti-
mations such as component, severity, start and end date,
and phase. Unlike them we are interested in estimating
vulnerability fix time not defect fix time.
In contrast to prior work, which often is based on open-
source software, we estimate the vulnerability fix time
based on an industrial case study of a major software
development company, based on distinct datasets that
include security issues before and after release and com-
bine them with project and component-related data. Our
objective is to identify the impacting strength of the factors
Table 1 Examples of time required for fixing vulnerabilities [10]
Vulnerability type Average fix time (min)
Dead code (unused methods) 2.6
Lack of authorization check 6.9
Unsafe threading 8.5
XSS (stored) 9.6
SQL injection 97.5
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on vulnerability fix time as well as to predict issue fix time
in general.
3 Secure Software Development at SAP
To ensure a secure software development, SAP follows the
SAP Security Development Lifecycle (S2DL). Figure 1
illustrates the main steps in this process, which is split into
four phases: preparation, development, transition, and
utilization.
To allow the necessary flexibility to adapt this process to
the various application types (ranging from small mobile
apps to large-scale enterprise resource-planning solutions)
developed by SAP as well as the different software
development styles and cultural differences in a worldwide
distributed organization, SAP follows a two-staged security
expert model:
1. a central security team defines the global security
processes, such as the S2DL, provides security train-
ings, risk identification methods, offers security testing
tools, or defines and implements the security response
process;
2. local security experts in each development area/team
are supporting the developers, architects, and product
owners in implementing the S2DL and its supporting
processes.
For this study, the development and utilization phases of
the S2DL are the most important ones, as the activities
carried out during these phases detect most of the vulner-
abilities that need to be fixed:
• during the actual software development (in the steps
secure development and security testing) vulnerabilities
are detected, e.g., by using manual and automated as
well as static and dynamic methods for testing appli-
cation security [2, 22]. Most detected vulnerabilities
are found during this step, i.e., most vulnerabilities are
fixed in unreleased code (e.g., in newly developed code
that is not yet used by customers);
• security validation is an independent quality control
that acts as ‘‘first customer’’ during the transition from
software development to release, i.e., security valida-
tion finds vulnerabilities after the code freeze (called
correction close) and the actual release;
• security response handles issues reported after the
release of the product, e.g., by external security
researchers or customers.
If an issue is confirmed (e.g., by an analysis of a security
expert), from a high-level perspective developers and their
local security experts implement the following four steps:
1. analyze the issue, 2. design or select a recommended
solution, 3. implement and test a fix, and 4. validate (e.g.,
by retesting the fixed solution) and release this fix. Of
course, the details differ depending on the development
model of the product team and, more importantly,
depending on whether the issue is detected in code that is
used by customers or not.
While the technical steps for fixing an issue are the same
regardless of whether the issue is in released code or cur-
rently developed code, the organizational aspects differ
significantly: For vulnerabilities in unreleased development
code, detecting, confirming, and fixing vulnerabilities are
lightweight process defined locally by the development
teams. Vulnerabilities detected by security validation, e.g.,
after the code freeze, even if in unreleased code, involve
much larger communication efforts across different orga-
nizations for explaining the actual vulnerabilities to
development as well as ensuring that the vulnerability is
fixed before the product is released to customers.
Fixing vulnerabilities in released code requires the
involvement of yet more teams within SAP, as well as
additional steps, e.g., for back-porting fixes to older
releases and providing patches (called SAP Security Notes)
to customers.
Let us have a closer look on how an externally reported
vulnerability in a shipped software version is fixed: First,
an external reporter (e.g., customer or independent security
researcher) contacts the security response team, which
assigns a case manager. The case manager is responsible
for driving the decision if a reported problem is a security
vulnerability that needs to be fixed, and for ensuring that
the confirmed vulnerability is fixed and that a patch is
released. After vulnerability is confirmed, the case manager
contacts the development team and often also a dedicated
maintenance team (called IMS) to ensure that a fix is
developed and back-ported to all necessary older releases
(according to SAP’s support and maintenance contracts).
The developed fixes are subject to a special security test by
the security validation team and, moreover, the response
Preparation Development Utilization Transition 
Training Risk Identification 
Plan Security 
Measures 
Secure 
development 
Security 
testing 
Security 
Validation 
Security 
Response 
Fig. 1 Overview of the SAP Security Development Lifecycle (S2DL)
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teams reviews the SAP Security Note. If the technical fix as
well as the resulting Security Note passes the quality
checks, the Security Note is made available to customers
individually and/or in the form of a support package
(usually on the first Tuesday of a month). Support packages
are functional updates that also contain the latest security
notes.
4 Background
Assume a response variable y and a set of independent
variables xi such that y ¼ f ðx1; x2; . . .; xnÞ where f repre-
sents the systematic information that the variables xi pro-
vide about y [23]. Regression models relate the quantity of
a response factor, i.e., dependent variable to the indepen-
dent variables.
Different regression models have different capabilities,
e.g., in terms of their resistance to outliers, their fit for
small datasets, and their fit for a large number of predicting
factors [24]. However, in general, a regression model is
assumed to be good, if it predicts responses close to the
actual values observed in reality. In this study, the per-
formance of a given model is judged by its prediction
errors; the low are the errors, the better is the performance
of the model.
This section provides background about the regression
methods, model’s performance metrics, and a metric for
measuring the relative importance of the prediction factors
used in the models.
4.1 Overview of Used Regression Methods
We give next an overview of the three methods used in this
study.
Linear Regression This method assumes that the
regression function is linear in the input [25], i.e., in the
prediction factors. The linear method has the advantage of
being simple and allows for an easy interpretation of the
correlations between the input and output variables.
Tree-Based Regression This method recursively parti-
tions the observations, i.e., the data records of the object
being analyzed, for each of the prediction factors (aka
features) such that it reduces the value of a metric that
measures the information quantity of the splits [26]. In this
study, we use the method recursive partitioning and
regression trees (RPART) [27].
Neural Network Regression This method represents
functions that are nonlinear in the prediction variables. It
uses a multi-layer network that relates the input to the
output through intermediate nodes. The output of each
intermediate node is the sum of weighted input of the nodes
of the previous layer. The data input is the first layer [28].
These three regression methods are the basic ones that
are commonly used in data analytics. In this study, we use
their implementations in packages for the statistics lan-
guage R:1 rpart2 for RPART, and nnet3 for NNR. The
implementation ‘‘lm’’ of the linear regression (LR) is
already contained within the core of R.
4.2 Model Performance Metrics
Regression methods infer prediction models from a given
set of training data. Several metrics have been developed to
compare the performance of the models in terms of accu-
racy of the generated predictions [29]. The metrics indicate
how well the models predict accurate responses for future
inputs. Next, we describe the three metrics that we used in
this work, the coefficient of determination (R2) [30], the
Akaike information criterion (AIC) [29] and the prediction
at a given level (PRED) [30].4
Coefficient of Determination (R2) This metric ‘‘sum-
marizes’’ how well the generated regression model fits the
data. It computes the proportion of the variation of the
response variable as estimated using the generated regres-
sion compared to the variation of the response variable
computed using the null model, i.e., the mean of the val-
ues [29]. The following equation formulates the metric.
R2 ¼ 1
Pn
i¼0 ðxi  x^iÞ2Pn
i¼0 ðxi  xÞ2
ð1Þ
Here n is the number of observations, xi is the actual value
for observation i, x^i is the estimated value for observation i,
and x is the mean of xi values.
The LR method focuses on minimizing R2. Thus, Spiess
and Neumeyer, for example, consider that the metric is not
appropriate for evaluating nonlinear regression mod-
els [32]. Nevertheless, the metric is often used to compare
models, e.g., [29]. In this study, we use the metric to
evaluate the performance of the prediction models in pre-
dicting the test dataset and not the training dataset. The
metric provides a ‘‘summary’’ of the errors of the
predictions.
Akaike Information Criterion This metric estimates the
information loss when approximating reality. The follow-
ing equation formulates the metric [29].
AIC ¼ n log
Xn
k¼0
ðxi  x^iÞ2=n
 !
þ 2ðk þ 2Þ ð2Þ
1 https://www.r-project.org/about.html.
2 https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/rpart/rpart.
3 https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/nnet/nnet.
4 We avoided the metric Mean of the Magnitude of the Relative Error
(MMRE) as it was shown to be misleading [31].
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Here n is the number of observations, xi is the actual value
for observation i, x^i is the estimated value for observation i,
and k is the number of variables.
A smaller AIC value indicates a better model.
Prediction at a Given Level This metric computes the
percentage of prediction falling within a threshold h [33].
The following equation formulates the metric
PREDðhÞ ¼ 100
n

Xn
i¼1
1 if
xi  x^i
xi
 h
0 otherwise
(
ð3Þ
Here n is the number of observations, xi is the actual value
for observation i, x^i is the estimated value for observation i,
and h is the threshold, e.g., 25 %.
The perfect value for the PRED metric is 100 %.
4.3 Variable Importance
This metric measures the relative contributions of the dif-
ferent predicting factors used by the regression method to
the response variable. For statistical use, such metric could
be, for example, the statistical significance while for
business use, the metric could be the ‘‘impact on the pre-
diction factor’’ on the (dependent) response variable. In this
work, we use the variable importance metric employed in
the RPART regression method.5 The metric measures the
sum of the weighted reduction in the impurity method (e.g.,
the Shannon entropy and the variance of response variable)
attributed to each variable [34, 35].6 It associates scores
with each variable, which can be used to rank the variables
based on their contribution to the model.
5 Methodology
Figure 2 depicts the process that we used in this study; a
process quite similar to the one used by Bener et al. [36].
First, we define the goal of the data analytics activity,
which is to develop a function for predicting the issue fix
time using the data that SAP collects on its processes for
fixing vulnerabilities in pre-release and post-release soft-
ware. The following steps are: collect data that could help
achieve the goal; prepare the data to be used to derive
insights using statistical methods; explore the collected
datasets to understand the used coding scheme, its content,
and the relationships between the data attributes; develop
prediction models for each of the collected datasets;
compute metrics on the model; and try to find explanations
and arguments for the results. The results of the models
analysis were used to identify ways to improve the models.
The improvements included the collection of new datasets
for dependent information, e.g., about projects. We discuss
next the individual steps in more details.
5.1 Data Collection
SAP maintains three datasets on fixing security vulnera-
bilities, which we refer to as our main data sources. In
addition, it maintains a dataset about components, and a
dataset about projects, which we call support data. Table 2
lists the different datasets we use. The datasets used in our
study span over distinct time periods for each dataset (e.g.,
about 5 years).
The security testing process records data about fixing
issues in two datasets. First, ABAP developers use SLINT
for security code analysis. In Data source 1, the tool
records data related to a set of attributes about each of the
issues it discovers and the tasks performed on these issues.
Table 3 lists these attributes.
Second, Java and JavaScript developers use Fortify7 and
C?? developers use Coverity to analyze software for
security issues. In Data source 2, these tools record data
related to a set of attributes about each of the vulnerabili-
ties they discover and the tasks performed on these vul-
nerabilities. Table 4 lists these attributes.
In Data source 3, the security response process main-
tains data about fixing issues discovered in released soft-
ware. The data are collected and maintained through a Web
form; it is not collected automatically as in the case of Data
sources 1 and 2. The attributes of this Data source are listed
in Table 5.
Develop 
models 
Analyze the 
models 
Collect data Prepare the data 
Explore the 
data 
Set research 
goal 
Fig. 2 Analysis method
5 We use function varImp().
6 There are other methods for ranking variables. We choose this
method, which comes with RPART, because most the variables are
categorical.
7 Since 2013, SAP uses Checkmarx for analyzing JavaScript. Thus,
the use of Fortify by JavaScript developers declines since then.
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Each issue can relate to a concrete component. Com-
ponents are groups of applications that perform a common
business goal. A system consists of a set of components.
Table 6 lists the components attributes.
A software is developed in the context of a project.
Table 7 lists the attribute of the projects dataset (Support
data 2). We Extended data source 2 with project descrip-
tions data; we joined Data source 2 and Support data 2. We
also added three computed fields to the dataset:
1. FixtoRelease_period: The time elapsed from fixing the
given issue to releasing the software.
2. Dev_period: The time elapsed from starting the
development to closing the development of the soft-
ware that contains the issue.
3. FoundtoRelease_period: The time elapsed from dis-
covering the issue to the releasing of the software that
contains the issue.
The number of records for each of the basic datasets
ranges from thousands of records to hundred of thousands
of records. We did not provide the exact numbers to avoid
their misuse (in combination with potentially other public
data) to derive statistics about vulnerabilities in SAP
products, which would be outside the scope of this work.
5.2 Data Preparation
Using the collected data required us to prepare them for the
model generation routines. The preparation activities
Table 2 Datasets collected
from SAP’s tools
Dataset Description
Data source 1 Vulnerabilities found in ABAP code
Data source 2 Vulnerabilities found in Java and C?? code
Data source 3 Security messages
Support data 1 Components
Support data 2 Projects
Extended data source 2 Extend data source 2 with information about the projects (support data 2)
Extended data source 3 Extend data source 3 with information about the components (support data 1)
Table 3 List of the attributes of ABAP issue fixing (Data source 1)
Attribute Description
Date_found Date on which the issue was found
Date_solved Date on which the issue was closed
Vulnerability_name Vulnerability types such as memory corruption and buffer overflow
Project_ID Project identifier
Priority The priority of fixing the vulnerability. Range: 1 to 4, with 1 highest, 4 lowest priority
Vulnerability_count Number of issues of the same vulnerability found at once. This indicates that the issues might be related to the same
problem
Table 4 List of the attributes of Java and C?? issue fixing (Data source 2)
Attribute Description
Date_found Date on which the issue was found
Date_solved Date on which the issue was closed
Vulnerability_name Vulnerability types such as memory corruption and buffer overflow
Scan_source Tool that performed the scan, i.e., Coverity (for C?? code) or Fortify (for Java code)
Project_name Project identifier
Folder_name Indicates the required behavior of the developer toward the issue, e.g., must fix, fix one of the sets, optional, etc
Scan_status Status of the issues, i.e., new, updated, removed, and reintroduced (i.e., removed but reopened). It allows to identify
whether the issue is addressed or not, and is a false positive or not
Vulnerability_count Number of issues of the same vulnerability found at once
Priority The priority of fixing the vulnerability. Range: 1 to 4, with 1 highest and 4 lowest priority
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required cleaning the data and transforming them as needed
for processing.
Data Cleaning First, we identified the data columns
where data are frequently missing. Missing values impact
the results of the regression algorithms because these
algorithms may incorrectly assume default values for the
missing ones. We used plots such as the one in Fig. 3 to
identify data columns that require attention.
Second, we developed a set of plots to check outliers—
values that are far from the common range of the values of
the attributes. We excluded data rows that include
semantically wrong values, e.g., we removed records from
Data source 1 where the value of ‘‘Date_found’’ is 1 Dec.
0003.
Third, we excluded records related to issues that are not
addressed yet; we cannot deduce issue fix time of such
records.
Fourth, we excluded records that include invalid data.
For example, the vulnerability type attribute of Data source
2 includes values such as ‘‘not assigned,’’ ‘‘?,’’ and
‘‘&novuln.’’ The records that have these values are
excluded. There is no interpretation of prediction results
that include these values.
Table 5 List of the attributes for security messages (Data source 3)
Attribute Description
CVSS_score Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The score indicates also the urgency of fixing the vulnerability
Processor Identifier of development team/area and, thus, implicitly for the local instantiation of the S2DL
Reporter Identifier of the external researcher/company who reported the issue
Source The source of the reported issue such as internal, security testing tool, customers
Vulnerability_type Vulnerability type
Priority Priority of the issue to be fixed: low, medium, or high
Component Group of applications that perform a common business goal such as sales order or payroll
Table 6 List of the attributes for the components (support data 1)
Attribute Description
PTU_area The area of the component, e.g., CRM, IMS, ERP
Gr_component Component group, i.e., semantic aggregation of components based on superordinate level
Language The language(s) used to develop the component: ABAP, Java, ABAP and Java, or unknown
PPMS_product The name of product that the component is part of, as stated in PPMS (Projects Management System)
Comp_owner The component’s development group
Product_owner The product’s development group
Table 7 List of the attributes for projects (support data 2)
Attribute Description
Project_name The name of the project (internal program name)
Prg_typ_id Release related vs release unrelated (RR / UR)
Rel_type_id Project type (standard, etc.)
Rel_typ_id Release type ID (standard, pilot, etc.)
Delivery_mode_id Mode of delivery to the customer. Values are on premise, on demand, on mobile, etc
Maintstrategy_id Maintenance strategy. There is a codification for the strategies
Deploy_type Deployment type. There is a codification for the deployment
D2t_date Planned end of the test period. The period starts after the development closes
Devclose_date Closing date of the development
P2d_date Planned development starting date
P2r_date Planned release date
Prg_lead_resp Development team responsible for the project
Risk_expert Identifier of risk expert (anonymized data)
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Fifth, we excluded non-useful data attributes. These
include, for example, the case where the attribute is derived
from other attributes considered in the models.
Data Transformation First, we transformed the data of
some columns from type text to appropriate types. For
instance, we transformed the data of the CVSS column to
numeric. Next, we computed new data columns from the
source (original) data. For example,we computed the issue fix
time from the issue closing date and issue discovery date orwe
performed some attributes’ value transformations to obtain
machine readable data for model generation. Some attributes
contain detailed information that reduces the performance of
the regression algorithms. We addressed this issue by devel-
oping a good level of data aggregation for the prediction
algorithm. For example, the original dataset included 511
vulnerability types. We grouped the vulnerabilities types in
vulnerability categories, which helps to derive better predic-
tion models. Also, we aggregated the ‘‘component’’ variable
to obtain ‘‘Gr_component’’ to include in our regression.
5.3 Data Exploration
We developed a set of plots and statistics about the
frequencies of values for the factors and the relationship
between the issue fix time and some of the prediction
factors. For example, Fig. 4 shows the relationship
between the issue fix time in days and vulnerability type.
This gives us a first impression of the relations among the
attributes of a given dataset. Also, Table 8 shows the
coefficients of the linear regression (LR) of the issue fix
time using the factor message source, that identifies the
source of the reported issue. The table shows that the
coefficients in this categorical factor indicate the different
contributions of the factor on the issue fix time. The results
indicate different impacting strengths of the different
sources of security messages (e.g., external parties, cus-
tomers, or the security department) on the issue fix time.
5.4 Models Development
We partitioned each prepared Data source into a training
set that includes 80 % of the data and a test set (used to
validate the developed model) that includes the remaining
20 %.8 We used the training set to develop the prediction
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Fig. 3 Plot that visualizes missing data for Data source 3
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Fig. 4 Relationship between issue fix time (in days) and vulnerability
types in the context of Data source 3. CDR-1, INF-1, MEM, SQL,
TRV, XSS are internal codes for vulnerabilities types and code ‘‘?’’
indicates unknown or uncategorized type of reported vulnerabilities.
(Some vulnerability types do not appear on the X axis to ensure
clarity)
8 We used 80 % of the data for developing the prediction models and
not 60 % of the data because the size of Extended data source 3 is
limited: 380 records. (We wanted to use the same ratio for all
datasets.)
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models, or fits, and the test set to assess the goodness of the
generated models. The selection of the records for both sets
is random.
Next, we performed three operations for each of the
main data sources. First, we generated three prediction
models using the training set, one using the linear regres-
sion method, one using the RPART method, and one using
the NNR method. The three data sources have different
data attributes and cannot be combined. Thus, we cannot
use them together to develop a generic prediction model.
5.5 Models Analysis
We used the variable importance metric described in
Sect. 4.3 to assess the impact of the different prediction
factors on the issue fix time for each of the three data
sources. The metric indicates that the factor ‘‘project
name’’ is very important for Data source 2 and the factor
‘‘component’’ is very important for Data source 3. The
results and their appropriateness were discussed with the
security experts at SAP. We Extended data source 2 with
Support data 2 (i.e., projects dataset) and we Extended data
source 3 with Support data 1 (i.e., components dataset).
Next, we performed the model development phase
(Sect. 5.4) using the extended datasets. Then, we used each
of the prediction models to predict the issue fix time for the
test dataset and computed the performance metrics (see
Sect. 4.2) for each model. We discuss the results in the
next section.
6 Study Results
This section discusses the developed prediction models
addressing issue fix time and their performance, the relative
importance of the prediction factors, and the evolution of
mean vulnerability fix time over time.
6.1 Issue Fix Time Prediction Models
This section aims to address the question: How well do the
chosen models (LR, RPART, and NNR) predict the issue
fix time from a set of given factors?
Most of the data that we use are not numeric; they are
categorical variables, e.g., vulnerability types and compo-
nent IDs. The number of categories in each of these vari-
ables can be very high. For instance, there are about 2300
components. This makes the prediction models large, e.g.,
in the order of a couple of hundred of nodes for the tree-
based model and few thousands for the neural network
model. This problem of large sets for the categorical fac-
tors limits the ability to generate accurate prediction
models.
The regression algorithms cluster the elements of the
categorical variables automatically; this clustering does not
follow a given semantics, such as aggregation on super-
ordinate component level, i.e., ‘‘Gr_component’’ in Sup-
port data 1. Because of this, it is impractical to plot the
prediction models. Figure 5, for instance, shows a predic-
tion model that we generated from Data source 3 by using
the RPART method. The big number of (categorical) val-
ues for many of the prediction variables makes visualizing
the generated models clearly difficult.
Interestingly, we observe that the component factor is
built upon a set of distinct component classes (i.e., the first
three digits indicate the superordinate component level,
e.g., CRM for customer relationship management). An
investigation of underlying reasons for such clustering
might reveal, e.g., coherence with process-related factors.
6.2 Performance of Selected Regression Methods
on the Prediction of Issue Fix Time
This subsection addresses the question: Which of the
developed regression models gives the most accurate pre-
dictions? It reports and discusses the measurements of the
performance metrics (introduced in Sect. 4.2) that we
performed on the models that we generated for predicting
the issue fix time. Table 9 summarizes the measurements
that we obtained.
Coefficient of Determination Metric We observe that the
LRs method outperforms the RPART and NNR methods
for the five datasets. The metric values indicate that the
prediction models generated using LR explain about half of
the variation of the real values for Data source 1 and for
Data source 2 and explains most of the variations for the
remaining data sources. Indeed, the estimates of the model
for the Extended data source 2 perfectly match the
observed values. We note also that the residues metric
values indicate that the prediction models generated using
Table 8 Coefficients of the linear regression of issue fix time to
security message dataset (Data source 3)
Message source Coefficient p value
(Intercept) 249.17 \0.001
Code scan tool -50.04 \0.001
Central security department -38.05 \0.001
Customers -60.68 \0.001
External research organizations -102.78 \0.001
Internal development departments -12.21 0.304
Test services -124.74 \0.001
Validation services -21.88 0.136
L. Ben Othmane et al.
123
the NNR perform worse than the null model, that is, taking
the average of the values.
AIC Metric We observe that the LR method outperforms
the RPART and NNR methods for two datasets and that the
RPART method outperforms the LR and NNR methods for
the remaining three datasets. Thus, this metric gives mixed
results with respect to performance of the three regression
methods.
PRED Metric We observe that the LR method outper-
forms the RPART and NNR methods for two datasets, the
RPART method outperforms the LR and NNR methods for
one dataset, and the NNR method outperforms the RPART
and LR methods for two datasets. This gives mixed results
with respect to performance of the three regression meth-
ods. However, the NNR performance improves when the
dataset is extended with related data. For instance, the
PRED value increased from 0.73 % in the case of Data
source 3–65.05 % for the case of the Extended data
source 3. We acknowledge that the PRED value improved
also for the LR method for the case of Data source 2 and
Extended data source 2. However, the number of records
(N) for the Extended data source 2 is low (N ¼ 380); the
result should be taken with caution.
Different regression methods have shown conflicting
performance measurements toward the problem of effort
estimation. For example, Gray and MacDonell [24]
compared a set of regression approaches using MMRE
and PRED metrics. The methods have shown conflicting
results; their rank change based on the used performance
metrics. For example, they found that based on the
MMRE metric, LR outperforms NNR and based on the
PRED metric, NNR outperforms LR. This finding was
confirmed by Wen et al. [37] who analyzed the perfor-
mance of several other regression methods. The regres-
sion methods have different strengths and weaknesses.
Most importantly, they perform differently in the pres-
ence of small datasets, outliers, categorical factors, and
missing values. We found in this study that it is not
possible to claim that a regression method is better than
the other in the context of predicting the issue fix time.
This result supports the findings of Gray and MacDo-
nell [24] and of Wen et al. [37].
 84) vulnerabilitytype=,&OTHER,ACI-1,CDR-1,INF-1,MAC-1,MEM,XSS,XS
S-2 270   5063771.00  286.53700   
              168) Component=AP-RC-ANA-UI-XLS,BC-BSP,BC-CST-DP,BC-C
ST-IC,BC-CTS-SDM,BC-CTS-TMS,BC-DOC-HLP,BC-DOC-TTL,BC-I18,BC
-JAS-ADM-MON,BC-JAS-DPL,BC-SEC,BC-SEC-DIR,BC-SRV-ARL,BC-SR
V-FSI,BC-UPG-SLM,BC-UPG-TLS-TLJ,BC-WD-CMP-FPM,BC-XI-CON-AX
S,BC-XI-IBD,BC-XI-IBF,BI-BIP-AUT,BI-OD-STW,BI-RA-WBI,BW-BEX-OT-
MDX,CA-GTF-IC-BRO,CA-GTF-IC-SCR,CA-GTF-RCM,CRM-BF,CRM-BF-
SVY,CRM-CIC,CRM-IC-EMS,CRM-IC-FRW,CRM-IPS-BTX-APL,CRM-ISA,
CRM-ISA-AUC,CRM-ISE,CRM-LAM-BF,CRM-MD-PRO,CRM-MKT-DAM,C
RM-MKT-MPL,CRM-MSA,FS-CM,FS-SR,IS-A-DP,IS-U-CS-ISS,LO-AB-BS
P,LO-GT,MFG-ME,MOB-APP-EMR-AND,PA-GE,PLM-PPM-PDN,PLM-WUI
-RCP,PSM-GPR-SN,SBO-INT-B1ISN,SCM-EWM-RF,XAP-IC-IDM,XX-PRO
J-CDP-TEST-296 119   1015233.00  205.82350 * 
              169) Component=AP-CFG,AP-LM-MON-HC,AP-LM-SUP,AP-RC-
ANA-RT-MDA,AP-RC-RSP,AP-RC-UIF-RT,AP-SDM-EXC,BC-CCM-MON-
OS,BC-CCM-SLD-JAV,BC-CST,BC-CUS-TOL-CST,BC-DB-ORA-INS,BC-D
OC-TER,BC-ESI-WS-ABA,BC-ESI-WS-JAV-RT,BC-FES-BUS-RUN,BC-JA
S-ADM-ADM,BC-JAS-COR,BC-JAS-SEC-UME,BC-MID-RFC,BC-SEC-SA
L,BC-SRV-COM,BC-SRV-COM-FTP,BC-SRV-KPR-CS,BC-SRV-MCM,BC-
SRV-SSF,BC-WD-ABA,BC-WD-  
Fig. 5 Part of the prediction model generated from Data source 3
using RPART method. (It shows that there is a long list of component
IDs (among a set of about 2300 components) for the selection of
nodes 168 and 169 while also the parent node uses a set of
vulnerability types)
Table 9 Measurement of the
performance metrics of the
prediction models
Dataset LR RPART NN Best method
Residuals metric
Data source 1 0.526 0.498 -1.252 LR (0.526)
Data source 2 0.461 0.44 -0.294 LR (0.461)
Extended data source 2 1 0.956 -0.587 LR (1)
Data source 3 0.944 0.6585 1.944 LR (0.944)
Extended data source 3 0.909 0.701 1.97 LR (0.909)
AIC metric
Data source 1 122,465 123,157 141,462 LR (122,465)
Data source 2 334,565 335,936 365,665 LR (334,565)
Extended data source 2 -4877 463 793 RPART (463)
Data source 3 6632 6507 6958 RPART (6507)
Extended data source 3 6581 6421 7057 RPART (6421)
PRED metric
Data source 1 31.81 % 31.74 % 0.156 % LR (31.81 %)
Data source 2 14.93 % 13.96 % 33.81 % NN (33.81 %)
Extended data source 2 100 % 30.32 % 39.40 % LR (100 %)
Data source 3 33.98 % 34.71 % 0.73 % RPART (34.71 %)
Extended data source 3 35.41 % 34.52 % 65.05 % NN (65.05 %)
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6.3 Relative Importance of the Factors Contributing
to Issue Fix Time
This section aims to address the question: What are the
main factors that impact the issue fix time? To answer this
question, we computed the variable importance metric (see
Sect. 4.3) for each factors [38]. Given that the factors used
in the datasets are different, we present, and shortly dis-
cuss, each dataset separately, and we used the variable
importance metric discussed in Subsection 4.3 to compute
the importance of each factor.
Data source 1 Table 10 reports the importance of the
factors used in Data source 1 on issue fix time. The most
important factor in this dataset is ‘‘Project_ID,’’ followed
by ‘‘Vulnerability_name.’’ This implies that there is a
major contribution of the project characteristics to issue fix
time. Unfortunately, there were no additional metadata
available on the projects that could have been joined with
Data source 1 to allow us to further investigate aspects of
projects that impact the fixing time.
Data source 2 Table 10 reports the importance of the
factors used in Data source 2 on issue fix time. The most
important factor in this dataset is ‘‘Scan_status.’’ This shows
that depending on whether the issue is false positive or not
impacts the issue fix time.9 The second ranking factor is
‘‘Project_name,’’ followed by ‘‘Vulnerability_name.’’ This
results support the observation we had with Data source 1.
We observe also that the factor ‘‘Scan_source,’’ which
indicates the static code analysis tool used to discover the
vulnerabilities (i.e., Fortify or Coverity) is ranked at place 5.
Extended data source 2We Extended data source 2 with
data that describe the projects and computed three additional
variables: the time elapsed between fixing the vulnerability
and releasing the software, called FixtoRelease_period; the
development period, called Dev_period; and the time
elapsed between discovering the vulnerability and releasing
the software, called FoundtoRelease_period.
Table 11 reports the importance of the factors used in
the Extended data source on issue fix time. We observe that
the most important factor is FixRelease_period while a
related factor, FoundtoRelease_period has less importance
(rank 6). The other main important factors include the
development period (Dev_period), the project (Project_-
name), the risk expert (Risk_expert), the project develop-
ment team (Prg_lead_resp), and the vulnerability name
(Vulnerability_name). We observe that vulnerability name
is ranked at the seventh position.
Data source 3 Table 10 reports the importance of the
factors used in Data source 3 on the issue fix time. The
most important factor in this dataset is the software com-
ponent that needs to be changed (Component) followed by
the development team who addresses the issue (Processor).
We observe that the vulnerability name (Vulnerability_-
type) has a moderate importance, ranked 4th, while the
CVSS (CVSS_score) is ranked on the sixth position.
Extended data source 3We Extended data source 3 with
data that describe the components. Table 11 reports the
importance of the factors used in the Extended data
source 3 on the issue fix time. The most important factors
in this extended dataset is the component (Component),
followed by the development team (Processor), the devel-
opment team responsible for the component (Dev_-
comp_owner), the reporter of the vulnerability (Reporter),
and a set of other factors. We observe that the vulnerability
name (Vulnerability_type) has a moderate importance,
ranked eighth, and the CVSS score (CVSS_score)
decreased considerably to be 0.
6.4 Evolution of the Issue Fix Time
This section aims to address the question: Is the company
improving in fixing security issues? The tendency of the
issue fix time could be used as ‘‘indicator’’ of such
improvement. For instance, increasing time indicates
deteriorating capabilities and decreasing time indicates
improving capabilities. The information should not be used
as an evidence but as indicator of a fact that requires fur-
ther investigation.
Table 10 Importance factors
for the main datasets
Factor Data source 1 Data source 2 Data source 3
Rank Factor Metric Factor Metric Factor Metric
1 Project_ID 0.408 Scan_status 1.231 Component 3.653
2 Vulnerability_name 0.179 Project_name 0.956 Processor 3.352
3 Vulnerability_count 0.097 Vulnerability_name 0.841 Reporter 1.813
4 Priority 0.042 Folder_name 0.522 Vulnerability_type 0.879
5 Scan_source 0.238 Source 0.443
6 Priority 0.358 CVSS_score 0.230
7 Vulnerability_count 0.078
9 As indicated before, issues marked as, e.g., new and updated are not
considered in the models; they are for issues that are not addressed
yet.
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We modeled the evolution of the mean issue fix time for
the resolving (closing) issue month10 for the three data
sources using the LR, which shows the trend of the
response variable over time. Figure 6 depicts, respectively,
the mean issue fix time for (a) Data source 1 (pre-release
ABAP-based code), (b) Data source 2 (pre-release Java,
C??, and JavaScript-based code), and (c) Data source 3
(post-release security issues).
The figure indicates a fluctuation of the mean issue fix
time but with an increasing trend. This trend indicates a
deteriorating performance with respect to fixing security
issues. A close look at the figure shows that there is a
recent reverse in the tendency, which indicates a response
to specific events such as dedicated quality releases or the
development of new flag ship products. So-called quality
releases are releases that focus on improving the product
quality instead of focusing on new features. To ensure a
high level of product quality and security of SAP products,
top-level managements plans, once in a while, for such
quality releases. Also the development of new flagship
products that change the development focus of a large
fraction of all developers at SAP can have an influence.
Such a shift might result in significant code simplifications
of the underlying frameworks.
Figure 6 shows that the increasing global trend applies
to pre-release as well as post-release issues. We believe
that this indicates that the causes of the increase in the
mean issue fix time apply to both cases. We again see that
the management actions impacted both cases.
Berner et al. [36] advise that models are sensitive to
time. This work supports the claim because it shows that
the issue fix time is sensitive to the month of closing the
issue.
7 Analysis of the Impacting Factors
We observe from Data source 1 and Data source 2 that
projects (represented by, e.g., Project_ID, and Project_-
name data attributes) have major contributions to issue fix
time for the case of pre-release issue fixing. The extension
of Data source 2 with project-related data confirmed our
observation: the most impacting factors of pre-release
issues on the time to fix are project characteristics. Among
these characteristics, we find the time between issue fixing
and software release, project development duration, and the
development team (data attribute Project_name). We
believe that the factor time between issue fixing and soft-
ware release indicates that developers tend to fix vulnera-
bilities as the release date becomes close. This is not
surprising, since they must address all open issues before
the software can pass the quality gate to be prepared for
release. We expect that the factor project development
duration is related to, e.g., the used development models,
and the component-related characteristics. Further data
analysis shall provide insights about the impact of the
factors related to the project development duration
(Dev_period), such as component complexity. For
instance, updating smaller component could be easy and be
performed in short development cycles while updating
complex components requires long development cycles. In
addition, we believe that the factor development team
(Processor) indicates the level of expertise of the devel-
opers and the smoothness of communication and collabo-
ration among the team. Nevertheless, it is interesting to
observe that the influence of vulnerability type decreases
when project-related factors are included.
There are two additional dominant factors for the issue
fix time, based on the analysis of Data source 2: scan status
and folder name. We believe that the factor scan status
indicates that the developers address issues based on their
perception of whether the given issue is a false positive or
Table 11 Importance factors
for the extended datasets
Rank Extended data source 2 Extended data source 3
Factor Metric Factor Metric
1 FixtoRelease_period 0.946 Component 2.434
2 Dev_period 0.634 Processor 2.363
3 Project_name 0.634 Dev_comp_owner 1.380
4 Risk_expert 0.634 Reporter 1.207
5 Prg_lead_resp 0.672 Dev_product_owner 0.633
6 FoundtoRelease_period 0.433 PPMS_product 0.407
7 Vulnerability_name 0.429 PTU_area 0.407
8 Priority 0.045 Vulnerability_type 0.058
9 Vulnerability_count 0.045
10 Folder_name 0.045
10 Compute the mean issue fix time for the vulnerabilities resolved
(addressed) in the specified month.
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not and whether it is easy to address or not. For example,
they may close false positive issues that are easy to analyze
and postpone addressing issues that are difficult to analyze
and/or fix to, e.g., when the time for the quality gates
becomes close. We also expect that the factor ‘‘folder
name’’ indicates that the developers behave differently
toward issues flagged must fix, fix one of the sets, or
optional to fix.
The analysis of Data source 2 reveals that the security
scan tools (represented by the data attribute Scan_source)
are not a leading factor of issue fix time. It is possible that
the developers rely on their expertise in analyzing security
issues and not on the tool features as they get experts in
addressing security issues. Further analysis may explain the
finding better.
The results obtained from the analysis of Data source 3
(and its extension) suggest that the software structure and
development team characteristics are the dominant factors
that impact the issue fix time for the case of post-release
issue fixing. (Note that issues for post-release are not
related to projects but to released components.). The
analysis results show that the component factor is among
the most impacting factors on the issue fix time, which
indicates the impact of software structure characteristics.
Unfortunately, we do not have, at this moment, data that
describe the components, such as the component’s com-
plexity, which could be used to get detailed insights about
these characteristics.
The results obtained from the analysis of Data source 3
shows the dominance of the impact of processor and
reporter on the issue fix time and thus the importance of the
human-related factors. The importance of the reporter
factor is aligned with the results of Hooimeijer and Weimer
[39], who found a correlation between a bug reporter’s
reputation and triaging time: We confirm the importance of
the reporting source on vulnerability fix time. Unlike
Zhang et al. [18] finding, we found that severity, repre-
sented by the ‘‘CVSS_score’’ in our study, is not a leading
factor.
The qualitative study [4], which was based on expert
interviews at SAP, revealed several factors that impact the
issue/vulnerability fix time, such as communication and
collaboration issues, experience and knowledge of the
involved developers and security coordinators, and tech-
nology diversification. The results of this study confirm the
impact of some of these factors and show their importance.
For example, the category technology diversification
included factors related to technologies and libraries sup-
ported by the components associated with the given vul-
nerability. The impact of the component, found in our
current study, reflects these underlying factors. Unfortu-
nately, it was only possible to relate components’ attributes
to security messages, i.e., post-release issues, not to pre-
release issues to further investigate the components’ impact
on these. The impact of the development groups reflects the
importance of the experience and vulnerability- and soft-
ware-related knowledge of the teams as well as the
importance of the smoothness of communication and col-
laboration between the involved stakeholders.
At SAP, the project development teams work indepen-
dently; e.g., they choose their own development model and
tools, as long as they confirm to the corporate require-
ments, such as the global security policies. Further inves-
tigation of component-, project-, human-, and process-
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Fig. 6 Trend of the issue fix effort by closing month. The x axis indicates the number of months elapsed since the start date of the data. The
y axis indicates the mean issue fix time in number of days. a Data source 1. b Data source 2. c Data source 3
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related characteristics of the development teams might
reveal more insights on the underlying factors that impact
the issue fix time. Such investigation may reveal why
certain products/teams are more efficient than others.
Reasons may, for example, include the local setup of the
communication structures, the used development model
(i.e., SCRUM, DevOps.) and the security awareness of
teams. Another potential factor to check its impact is the
number of people involved in fixing the given issue. This
factor was found to impact the fix time of bugs [15, 40].
Controlling these factors allows to control the issue fix time
and thus the cost of addressing security issues.
A question worth also investigating is: Are the factors
that impact the time for addressing pre-release and post-
release issues similar? We argue in Sect. 3 that the pro-
cesses for fixing pre- and post-release issues are different,
which shall impact the issue fix time for both cases. Nev-
ertheless, acquiring evidence to answer this question
requires using the same data attributes for both cases,
which may not be possible, at the moment, with data col-
lected at SAP.
8 Study Validity and Impacts
This section discusses the impacts of the finding and the
limitations of the study.
8.1 Impacts of the Findings
This study showed that the models generated using the LR,
RPART, and NNR methods have conflicting accuracy
measurements in predicting the issue fix time. This implies
that the conflict in the performance measurements in esti-
mating software development effort, e.g., in [37], applies
to security issues. We infer from this result that there is no
better regression method, from the analyzed ones, when it
comes to predicting security issue time. We believe that
more work needs to be done to develop regression methods
appropriate for predicting issue fix time.
The second main finding of this study is that vulnera-
bility type is not the dominant impacting factors for issue
fix time. Instead, the dominant factors are the component in
which the vulnerability resides, the project related to the
issue, the development groups that address the issue, and
the closeness of the software release date, which are pro-
cess-related information. This result implies that we should
focus on the impact of software structure, developers’
expertise and knowledge, and secure software development
process when investigating ways to reduce the cost of
fixing issues.
The third main finding is that the monthly mean issue fix
time changes with the issue closing month. We can infer
from this result that the prediction models are time sensi-
tive; that is, they depend on the data collection period. This
supports Berner et al. advice to consider recently collected
data when developing prediction models [36]. We infer,
though, that prediction models are not sufficient for mod-
eling issue fix time since they provide a static view. We
believe that prediction methods should be extended to
consider time evolution, that is, combine prediction and
forecasting.
Finally, SAP can use the models to implement a con-
tinuous improvement of its secure software development
process and to measure the impact of individual improve-
ments. Other companies can use similar models and
mechanism to realize a learning organization.
8.2 Limitations
There is a consensus among the community that there are
many ‘‘random’’ factors involved in software development
that may impact the results of data analytics experi-
ments [36]. This aligned with Menzies et al.’s [19] findings
about the necessity to be careful about generalization of
results related to effort estimations in a global context.
The data analysis described in this report suffers from
the two common threats to validity that apply to effort
estimation [20]. First, the conclusions are based on the data
that SAP collects about fixing vulnerabilities in its soft-
ware. Changes to the data collection processes, such as
changes to the attributes of the collected data, could impact
the predictions and the viability of producing predictions in
the first place. Second, the conclusions of this study are
based on the regression methods we used, i.e., LR, RPART,
and NNR. There are many other single and ensemble
regression methods that we did not experiment with. We
note that performance issues due to the size of the datasets
inhibit us from using random forest [23] and boosting [23],
two ensemble regression methods.
In addition, the data are collected over 5 years. During
that time SAP refined and enhanced its secure software
development processes. This could bias our results. The
identification of major process changes along with the
times of the changes and a partitioning of the data
accordingly might reduce such bias and reveal measurable
insights about impacts of process changes on issue fix time.
On the positive side, the conclusions are not biased by
the limited data size and the subjectivity in the responses.
First the number of records of each of the dataset was high
enough to derive meaningful statistics. Second, the data are
generated automatically and do not include subjective
opinions, except the CVSS score of Data source 3. This
score is generated based on issue-related information that is
assessed by the security coordinator responsible for the
issue.
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Our findings are based on particular datasets of SAP and
might mirror only the particularities of time to fix issues for
this organization. However, SAP has a diversified software
portfolio, the development teams are highly independent in
using development processes and tools (as long as they
follow generic guidelines such as complying with corpo-
rate security requirements), teams are located in different
countries, and software are developed using several pro-
gramming languages (e.g., ABAP, C??, and Java). These
characteristics encourage us to believe that the findings
apply to industrial companies in general and therefore
contribute to the discussion about predicting the issue fix
time.
Vulnerabilities, such as SQL injection, cross-site
scripting (XSS), buffer overflow, and directory path
traversal are commonly identified using the same tech-
niques, such as taint analysis [41], but by applying differ-
ent patterns. This may explain why vulnerability type is not
a dominant factor of issue fix time—because the time to
analyze many of the vulnerability types using the tech-
niques is the same. These techniques may be used to detect
other defect types besides vulnerabilities, but not all (or
most) defects. Thus, the fact that vulnerability type is not a
dominant factor of issue fix time does not imply that the
study results apply to defects in general.
9 Lessons Learned
Data analytics methods are helpful tools to make general-
izations about past experience [36]. These generalizations
require considering the context of the data being used. In
our study, we learned few lessons in this regard.
Anonymization Companies prefer to provide anon-
ymized data for data analytics experiments and keep the
anonymization map to trace the results to the appropriate
semantics. There is a believe that the analyst would
develop models and the data expert (from the company)
would interpret them using the anonymization map. We
initially applied the technique and we found that it prevents
the analyst from even cleaning the data correctly. We
worked closely with the owner of the data to understand
them, interpret the results, and correct or improve the
models. The better the data analyst understands the data,
the more they are able to model them.
Prediction Using Time Series Data We initially sliced
the data sequentially into folds (sliced them based on their
order in the dataset) and used the cross-validation method
in the regression.11 We found that the performance metrics
of the generated prediction models deviate considerably.
To explore this further, we developed the tendency of the
mean issue fix time shown in Fig. 6. The figure shows a
fluctuation of the issue fix time over time. This leads to
believe that the prediction models are of temporal rele-
vance as claimed by Berner et al. [36]. The lesson warns to
check whether the data are time series or not when using
cross-validation with sequential slicing of the data in the
regression.
A more generic lesson that we learned concerns at-
tribute values clustering. We found in this study an
insignificant small difference in the performance of the
prediction models that automatically cluster components
and the ones that use semantically clustered components
instead. The latter aggregates components based on a
semantic based on superordinate level, i.e., Gr_component.
Manual investigation is necessary to infer the component
characteristics that the algorithms silently used in the
clustering. Table 12, for example, shows that the perfor-
mance of the prediction models using the automated clus-
tering and using the manual clustering are similar. This
implies that manual clustering does not provide additional
information.
10 Conclusions
We developed in this study prediction models for issue fix
time using data that SAP, one of the largest software
vendors worldwide, and the largest in Germany, collects
about fixing security issues in the software development
phase and also after release. The study concludes that none
of the regression methods that we used (linear regression
(LR), Recursive PARTitioning (RPART), Neural Network
Regression (NNR)) outperforms the others in the context of
predicting issue fix time. Second, it shows that vulnera-
bility type does not have a strong impact on the issue fix
time. In contrast, the development groups involved in
processing the issue, the component, the project, and the
closeness of the release date have strong impact on the
issue fix time.
Table 12 Predicted values for automatically clustered component
factor and Gr_component
Error metric LR RPART NNR
AC MC AC MC AC MC
RSQ 0.98 0.76 0.80 0.7045 2.02 1.92
AIC 6586 6187 6461 6139 7033 6733
PRED 33.88 34.12 33.48 32.6915 0.48 0.67
AC is for automatic clustering of components and MC is for manual
clustering of components
11 This slicing method allows for easily splitting all the data among
the folds.
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We also investigated in this study the evolution of the
mean issue fix time as time progresses. We found that the
issue fix time fluctuates over time. We suggest that better
models for predicting issue fix time should consider the
temporal aspect of the prediction models; they shall com-
bine both prediction technique and forecasting techniques.
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